President Cyril Ramaphosa announced on 13 July that he had placed Police Minister Senzo Mchunu on leave and had ordered a commission of inquiry into criminality within South Africa’s law enforcement agencies. Ramaphosa’s statement came a week after KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) provincial police commissioner, Lt Gen Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, publicly accused Mchunu of colluding with criminal elements.

The core of Mkhwanazi's allegations is that Mchunu disbanded the KZN political killings task team in December 2024, specifically to protect a politically connected criminal syndicate, which Mchunu denied. Mkhwanazi claimed that Mchunu was colluding with a businessman known as Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala via an intermediary called Brown Mogotsi. Matlala has a long and controversial history involving government tenders and has been linked with allegations of corruption and fraud. Notably, he is currently facing trial on charges of attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and money laundering.

The severity and public nature of Mkhwanazi’s allegations compelled Ramaphosa to act, despite the fact that Mchunu is a close political ally. According to Ramaphosa, the investigation will investigate “allegations relating to the infiltration of law enforcement, intelligence and associated institutions within the criminal justice system by criminal syndicates.” The commission will be led by Acting Deputy Chief Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga, who is set to retire from the Constitutional Court at the end of July. Madlanga is a respected figure, and his presence will lend credibility to the commission. This commission is expected to take at least six months and will provide Ramaphosa with reports every three months.

Ramaphosa further announced that he would appoint Wits University law professor Firoz Cachalia as acting Minister of Police from 1 August. In the meantime, another yet-to-be-named cabinet member will assume Mchunu’s duties. Cachalia is a respected figure who chaired the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council. He is also an African National Congress (ANC) member who is believed to support Ramaphosa and previously served as the MEC of Community Safety in Gauteng (2004-2009).

On the surface, these actions by Ramaphosa are commendable and appear to respond to the crisis outlined by Mkhwanazi’s allegations. However, the President frequently uses judicial commissions as a means of postponing actual action. This reluctance was clearly displaced by the fact that it took the president a full week to respond to Mkhwanazi’s allegations. Ramaphosa also has a poor record of acting on the findings and recommendations of his commissions. Most notably, the President has largely failed to act on the recommendations outlined by the State Capture Commission. In fact, Ramaphosa maintained individuals implicated by the commission in state capture corruption in his cabinet. Further, the planned new commission will not have the power to charge any individuals or organisations with any crimes it may uncover. Instead, it will need to refer these matters to law enforcement agencies and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Given that the commission will likely take more than six months to complete its work, it will likely take more than a year for this process to result in any actual criminal charges.

Cachalia will also be limited in his ability to implement any effective reforms at the police ministry.  His capacity as an acting minister raises questions about the legal scope of his authority and the extent to which he could make major policy and personnel changes at the department. Further, his appointment itself will likely face a legal challenge. Under the constitution, Ramaphosa can appoint two cabinet ministers from outside of Parliament. However, officially, Mchunu is still the Police Minister, and Cachalia will only be serving in an acting capacity, and as such, it is unclear if this exception can apply to him. Opposition parties have already indicated their intent to challenge the constitutionality of Cachalia’s appointment.

Ramaphosa’s refusal to simply dismiss Mchunu from cabinet is not just reflective of the President’s reluctance to take firm action. It also underscores the ANC’s tolerance of corruption allegations and resistance to acting affirmatively in such matters. It would be difficult for Ramaphosa to dismiss Mchunu, as such an action would place him under pressure to similarly remove ministers such as Human Settlements Minister Thembi Simelane and Deputy Water and Sanitation Minister David Mahlobo.

Yet, the fact that Ramaphosa was forced to act despite his close political relationship with Mchunu underscores the ANC’s declining power. The party is no longer so dominant that it can simply ride out such scandals with impunity. It also highlighted the clear links between politics and organised crime in South Africa. These links solidified during the so-called state capture years under former president Jacob Zuma and have been aggravated by the rise of criminal rackets in key sectors such as construction and logistics.

It is unlikely that the new commission, chaired by Justice Madlanga, will result in any concrete actions or reforms. However, it will be sufficient to provide the appearance of action, which should soothe investors and international financial partners. Most notably, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is currently assessing whether to remove South Africa from its grey list.

Regardless of whether Mchunu is innocent, Mkhwanazi’s allegations have highlighted the real concern about the growing presence of influence of organised crime in South Africa, including in the country’s senior law enforcement and political circles. The rising pressure on Ramaphosa to act against Mchunu, who is a firm ally of the President, also has strong political undertones in the context of an ongoing factional showdown within the ANC between Ramaphosa and Deputy President Paul Mashatile. The latter is said to be mobilising within party ranks to both reduce Ramaphosa’s power and boost his own as the leadership race to succeed Ramaphosa heats up. Related infighting and jostling to contain influence will continue ahead of the ANC National Conference in 2027, complicating governance as Mashatile and Ramaphosa pursue conflicting approaches to both South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) and the architecture of the ANC’s leadership.