Ethiopia will hold its general election countrywide on 1 June; the electoral campaign period is already underway and is set to formally end on 27 May. However, the upcoming elections are threatened by ethnonationalist conflicts and an impending constitutional crisis. Collectively, these threats, combined with the elevated political environment over the elections, will test Ethiopia’s unity and stability in the coming months.

Under Ethiopia’s electoral system, members of the House of People’s Representatives (the lower legislative house) are elected in single-member constituencies via a first-past-the-post system. The 547-member chamber then elects a prime minister who goes on to form the government. In Ethiopia, the prime minister is the main political power, while the president holds a more constitutional and ceremonial role. The actual outcome of the election is not in question as the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) is expected to retain its commanding majority, and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, is expected to be returned to office. The PP currently holds 457 of the 547 parliamentary seats. Opposition parties are not expected to present a meaningful challenge to Abiy’s party despite the fact that they have formed new coalitions ahead of the election in order to launch a unified, better-resourced campaign.

The real threat to the election comes from Ethiopia’s existing security challenges. The country is currently experiencing numerous ethnonationalist conflicts of varying intensity. Nearly every region in the country is impacted by these conflicts in some way. The largest of these are in the Oromia and Amhara regions, while worsening political tensions in the Tigray region threaten to revive war in that province.

Presently, the worst conflict is being fought against Amhara nationalist militias, known locally as Fano. These militant groups have unified under the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), which is successfully waging an insurgency in much of the Amhara region, the second largest in the country. Ethiopian officials have sought to restrict media access and reporting on this conflict, but information that has emerged indicates that the Fano fighters have been able to capture some territory and inflict casualties on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) units deployed to combat them. These militia groups gained prominence during the 2020-2022 Tigray War when they fought on the side of the government. However, this conflict animated nationalistic sentiment and the desire among these forces for greater autonomy and even independence. Thus, once the Tigray War ended, these newly armed militant groups began fighting government forces. Fano leaders have expressed their opposition to the upcoming election; as such, authorities will struggle to hold elections in much of the Amhara region without risking voting stations being targeted by Fano militants.

Similarly, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) militant group has also denounced the upcoming elections. The OLA is an Oromo nationalist militant group that seeks greater autonomy for the Oromia region (Ethiopia’s largest). Although the OLA does not present the same level of threat as AFNM, it still has the capacity to carry out attacks across Oromia and its neighbouring regions. Its opposition to the election presents a serious threat to any electoral activities in the Oromia region, especially outside of major urban areas.

The Amhara and Oromia insurgencies present the most significant security concern ahead of and on election day. These militants will view voting stations as legitimate targets and could seek to disrupt electoral preparations and voting. However, the most significant post-election threat is from the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the erstwhile ruling party in the Tigray region and former power within the PP’s predecessor, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The power shifts in 2018 that brought Abiy to power sidelined the TPLF within the EPRDF and ultimately led to the outbreak of the Tigray War in 2020. This civil conflict resulted in as many as 378,000 deaths and displaced over 3 million people. The war ended with a negotiated settlement in 2022.

Tensions between the TPLF and the federal government are currently rising, in large part due to the fact that the TPLF has been excluded from the 1 June general election. National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) revoked the TPLF’s formal status as a political party over a dispute regarding the party’s contested 2023 elective conference and the TPLF’s refusal to re-register as a new party after the 2022 peace accords. As such, the TPLF will not be appearing on the 1 June ballot. However, the party will not accept another political entity assuming control of the Tigray region.

Since the 2022 peace accords, Tigray has been overseen by an interim administration largely led by TPLF-aligned figures. However, the party has also considered itself the rightful rulers of the Tigray region; on 19 April, it formally rejected Abiy’s decision to extend the interim government’s mandate and indicated that it would reestablish the pre-war government. This is a direct challenge to Abiy’s authority and is further confirmation that the TPLF will not accept the 1 June election result. The party’s refusal to accept the election result and its likely forced return as the regional government will trigger a constitutional crisis. Abiy will be compelled to deploy the ENDF to enforce the election result, leading to a showdown with the TPLF and a potential resumption of the Tigray War.

A conflict in the Tigray region has the potential to rapidly escalate. It will exacerbate the conflict in neighbouring Amhara region as ENDF forces will need to be redeployed to Tigray region, alleviating pressure on the Fano fighters. In addition, the TPLF has been strengthening its ties with Eritrea (which also has a worsening relationship with Ethiopia) and the possibility of the northern neighbour being pulled into such a conflict cannot be discounted.

There are limited options available to Ethiopia to avoid a deterioration in its security environment over the election period. Additional security forces are expected to be deployed across the country to protect voting stations and suppress militant activity. Federal troops in the Tigray region will be bolstered to discourage the TPLF from taking any antagonistic action. However, the various actors, including Abiy himself, appear to be resigned to these tensions coming to a head. As such, some form of new security crisis is expected in the Tigray region in the coming months while the conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions deteriorate.